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Taxing sugar-sweetened beverages: impact
on overweight and obesity in Germany
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Abstract
Background: Consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) increases the risk of overweight and obesity.
Taxing SSBs could decrease daily energy consumption and body weight. This model-based study evaluated the
impact of a 20% SSB-sales tax on overweight and obesity in the context of Germany.
Methods: The population aged 15–79 years was modelled. Taxation was assumed to affect energy consumption
via demand elasticities, which affected weight and BMI. Model-based analysis was performed to estimate the tax
impact on BMI in different age, gender and income groups.
Results: Implementing a 20% SSB tax reduced energy consumption mainly in younger age groups, males, and
those with low income. Taxation decreased the mean BMI in younger groups, with the largest decrease in those
aged 20–29 years, while effects in groups 60 years or above were minimal. In absolute terms, taxation was
estimated to avoid 1,028,000 (−3% relative reduction) overweight individuals and 479,000 obese individuals
(−4%). Overweight decreased the most in males aged 20–29 years (408,000 fewer cases /−22%), the same
applied for obesity (204,000/−22%).
Conclusions: An SSB tax could have significant impact on overweight and obesity, which could translate into
substantial reductions of morbidity and mortality.
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Background
Overweight (defined as a body mass index of 25–29.9)
and obesity (BMI ≥30) are increasingly common, burden-
ing billions of people around the world [1], while being
associated with a large range of diseases spanning from
cardiovascular (including hypertension and coronary heart
disease) over endodocrinologic diseases (including dia-
betes mellitus type 2 and hyperlipidemia) to neoplasms
and psychologic disorders [2, 3].
Sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) are an important
dietary energy source. As they are freely available and
actively marketed [4], their consumption has been in-
creasing in many countries, contributing to the growing
prevalence of obesity [5, 6]. Given that the major SSB
consumers are children, adolescents, and (often poorly
educated) individuals from lower socio-economic status,
who are less aware of SSBs’ harmful effects, there have
been calls calling for governmental action to act to reduce
SSB consumption [7].
An SSB tax has been suggested to restrict SSB con-
sumption. Given the consumption profile, such tax would
likely reduce SSB and energy consumption and associated
morbidities mainly in low- instead of high-income groups,
thereby alleviating existing inequities in health [8–10].
The revenues of the tax could be further used for further
public health actions against overweight and obesity, like
subsidizing healthy drinks or foods [4]. SSB taxes are in
place in several US states, Mexico and a number of
European and Pacific countries [7, 11], and have been
found effective for reducing SSB consumption in natural
experiments [12, 13].
A number of health economic modeling studies found
an SSB tax to reduce the risk of overweight and obesity
[4, 14–18]. At present, no evidence on how this tax* Correspondence: falk.schwendicke@charite.de
1Department of Operative and Preventive Dentistry, Charité -
Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Aßmannshauser Str. 4-6, 14197 Berlin, Germany
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Schwendicke and Stolpe BMC Public Health  (2017) 17:88 
DOI 10.1186/s12889-016-3938-4
would reduce overweight and obesity in Germany are




This modelling study was built on the rationale that
price increases as a consequence of additional SSB
taxation would change SSB and other beverage pur-
chases. The basis for our predictions as to this purchase
reaction were empirical price elasticities of demand.
Changed purchases resulted in altered energy con-
sumption and, eventually, impacted on an individual’s
weight, thereby changing the BMI. We further assumed
that beverage consumption and weight/BMI differed
according to gender, age and income groups in the II
German Nutrition Survey (NSV II). Elasticities were
also assumed to differ between income groups. The
model underlying this study (Fig. 1) has been previously
used to estimate the impact of an SSB tax on dental
caries and to estimate potential revenues as well as cost
savings from such a tax in the context of German
healthcare [19].
Comparators
Theoretically, an SSB tax can be levied per calorie value
or gram of sugar (“specific tax”), or per value of sales
unit (“ad valorem tax”), and can be implemented as an
excise tax (before sales) or as a sales tax (at point of
sale). We modelled the implementation of a national
20% sales tax on SSBs as an addition to existing value
added tax (VAT). In our study, SSBs were beverages with
added caloric sugars such as lemonades, fruit or sport
drinks, but not fruit juice, milk products, non-sweetened
(tea or coffee) or artificially sweetened beverages. The
comparator was current practice, i.e. 0% SSB tax.
Setting and perspective
The setting of this study was Germany. As we did not as-
sess any cost of disease impact or tax revenues, no further
specifications of the perspective of this study needed to be
made.
Target population and horizon
We simulated the 2015 German population aged 15–79
years. Those aged 14 years or younger were not investi-
gated because consumption data were unavailable,
while those aged >79 years were excluded because their
SSB consumption was negligible. Modeling was strati-
fied by sex and in 10-year age bands (except for 15–19
years). Population data were drawn from 2012 federal
statistics, assuming no changes since then [20]. House-
hold income data were used to construct three income
strata, assuming that income was associated with bever-
age consumption and obesity (as reported in the II
German Nutrition Survey, NSV II) as well as own- and
cross-price elasticities (using additional data from a re-
cent meta-analysis [17]). As we assumed any changes in
energy intake to result in steady state weight changes
(see below), we did not need to follow-up patients (i.e.
the horizon of this study was a few months until this
steady state of weight was reached). Note that this also as-
sumes our price-elasticities explain short-term changes in
demand; in the longer term, price elasticities tend to be
higher and the effect of the SSB tax on obesity would
likely be even larger.
Beverage and energy consumption
Details on beverage and energy consumption can be
found elsewhere [19]. Briefly, estimates of beverage con-
sumption (specifically, SSB, fruit juice, milk) in different
gender, age and income groups from the NSV II [21]
were matched with population age groups. While the
overall volume of consumed beverages was known, the
specific consumption of each beverage type was reported
Fig. 1 The SSB tax was assumed to affect consumption of different
beverages via elasticity of demand, which in turn affected energy
consumption and, consequently, body weight and BMI. The
references for different data sources are additionally shown
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only by gender and income. We assumed that relative
differences between gender and income groups as to the
share of different consumed beverage types per overall
volume were constant across age groups, too. This ap-
proach was validated by comparing the expected overall
consumptions with the summed consumptions of differ-
ent beverage types in all groups (Table 1). Beverage
consumption was transformed into energy consumption
via energy density (Table 2) using a Standard Reference
[22].
Effectiveness
Our health outcome parameter was the BMI, i.e. an indi-
vidual’s weight in kg per squared body height in meters.
Implementation of an SSB tax was assumed to change en-
ergy consumption and, thereby, weight. As body height
was stable, BMI changed.
Price elasticity and pass-on rate
Price elasticity is consumers’ relative increase or decrease
in purchases of goods (here: beverages) in reaction to rela-
tive price changes (in this case resulting from taxation).
Own-price elasticity is the percentage change in purchases
of a good when the price of this good changes by one
percent; cross-price elasticity is the percentage change in
purchases of a good when the price of another good
changes by one percent. Since no elasticity data for
Germany were obtainable, data reported in a recent
meta-analysis [17] were used, details on this can be
found elsewhere [19]. Briefly, own- and cross-price
elasticities for SSBs (lemonade, fruit drinks), fruit juice
and milk (average of whole and skim milk as far as this
was assessed) were extracted. Elasticities differ by in-
come status [13, 23], which is why we modelled elastici-
ties in low and middle income groups separately from
those in high income groups. Elasticities were assumed
to not differ by age or gender (Table 2). As this
assumption might lead to distortions via cross-price
elasticities (specific age and gender groups who con-
sume only minimal amounts of SSBs are likely to have
a lower cross-price elasticity than high-SSB consuming
groups), we additionally performed a sensitivity ana-
lysis, adjusting cross-elasticities in different age groups
for the consumed amount of SSB. This was done by
dividing the cross-price elasticities by the average SSB
consumption over all age groups in a specific stratum (like
male individuals with high income) and multiplying them
with the estimated age-group specific SSB consumption,
based on the plausible assumption that any consumer’s
cross-price elasticity would be zero in the limiting case of
zero pre-tax SSB consumption (as there would be no
post-tax reduction in SSB consumption to be substituted).
That way, cross-price elasticities decreased in (mainly eld-
erly) low SSB consuming groups and increased in (mainly
young) high SSB consuming groups.
Manufacturers can pass a tax onto consumers as a
price increase. Theoretically and assuming a fully com-
petitive market, this pass-on rate should be 100%, which
we modelled in our base-case. However, many markets
(the beverage market being one of them) are not fully
competitive, with increased costs (as a result of the tax)
being possibly absorbed by the manufacturer or even
over-shifted to consumers [12, 24–28]. We therefore
modelled an 80% pass-on rate in a sensitivity analysis.
Impact on BMI
To estimate the prevalence of overweight and obesity,
data from the most recent national census was used
[29], which builds on self-reported data for body weight
and height in different sex, age, and income subgroups
aged 18 years or above. For those aged 15–17, we used
data from the German Study on Children and Adolescents
[30]. Both body weight and height were modelled using
the gamma function [31].
To estimate changes in BMI per changes in consumed
energy, we used published energy balance equations
[32], which had been used before for similar modelling
studies, assuming that a daily reduction in energy intake
of 94 kJ (SD: 2.96) would lead to a body weight reduc-
tion of 1 kg [18, 31], with a new steady state body weight
Table 1 Consumption of SSBs, juice and milk (ml/day per





Age low middle high low middle high
15–18 SSB 416 260 265 416 260 252
Juice 329 383 333 291 383 372
Milk 231 231 240 154 154 168
19–24 SSB 690 471 480 306 191 185
Juice 304 366 318 259 341 331
Milk 188 188 196 135 135 148
35–34 SSB 517 353 360 198 118 113
Juice 289 337 293 234 308 296
Milk 162 162 168 118 118 129
35–50 SSB 302 206 210 150 89 85
Juice 236 275 239 164 216 207
Milk 126 126 131 92 92 101
35–50 SSB 178 111 113 63 37 35
Juice 185 215 172 136 170 162
Milk 95 95 99 77 77 84
65–80 SSB 59 41 41 41 24 23
Juice 124 143 114 139 174 165
Milk 85 85 88 83 83 91
Note that consumption data for water etc. is not given
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established thereafter [33]. We also assumed that the
physical activity level of each individual would be un-
affected by weight loss.
Discount rate
Discounting was not applied in this study given the short
horizon.
Analytical methods
Spreadsheet-based Monte Carlo simulations were used
to estimate the effect of an SSB tax on body weight and,
subsequently, BMI. Parameter uncertainty was intro-
duced by randomly sampling variables from triangular
or gamma distributions. Note that parameters were
drawn independently, ignoring a possible correlation.
For each modeled group, 100 individuals were simulated,
each group then being modeled 100 times. Computa-
tional constraints prevented a higher number of walks,
which might have enhanced the reliability of results.
Moreover, confidence intervals were only calculated for
the primary analyses (changes in energy intake and
BMI), while for population level estimates, only point es-
timates were reported based on the sum of estimates
yielded for separate groups [16]. Microsoft Excel (Micro-
soft, Redwood, USA), YASAIw (University of Washing-
ton) and SPSS 20 (IBM, Armonk, USA) were used for
modeling and analysis.
Results
Based on our simulations, a 20% SSB tax reduced daily
energy consumption in males and, to a lesser degree, fe-
males (Table 3). The reduction was higher in younger
than older people, and in low- than in middle- or high-
income individuals. In older individuals, especially fe-
males, taxation even increased energy consumption
slightly. This was, as the assumed cross-price elasticity
led to increased consumption of fruit juices (which have
significant caloric value), while SSB consumption de-
creased only minimally (as absolute consumption was
low in this age group even without taxation).
The mean BMI under current conditions was generally
higher in male than female populations (except for those
aged 15–19 years), and increased with age up to the age
group 60–69 years. BMI was also inversely associated
with income. Most individuals aged 30 or above were
overweight according to the mean BMI (Table 4).
Assuming implementation of an SSB tax, the BMI
decreased mainly in younger groups, with the largest
decrease in those aged 20–29 years (Table 4). Taxation
also decreased the BMI in groups with low rather than
high income, and males rather than females. Taxation
had no or even minimally disadvantageous effect on
BMI in groups 60 years or above (given the described in-
creased consumption of fruit juice).
On the population level, taxation avoided 1,028,000
(−3%) overweight individuals and 479,000 (−4%) obese
Table 2 Price-elasticities of demand and mean (min/max) energy content of different beverages
Low or middle income stratum High income stratum Energy content (kcal/100 ml)
Own-/Cross-price elasticity
Beverage Mean 95% lower CI 95% upper CI Mean 95% lower CI 95% upper CI Source
SSB −1.21 −3.87 −0.69 −0.908 −2.903 −0.518 Long 2015 [17] 42 (37–50)
juice 0.637 0.140 1.447 0.459 0.098 1.0129 Long 2015 [17] 50 (46–56)
milk 0.150 −0.080 0.410 0.188 −0.10 0.513 Long 2015 [17] 60 (55–64)
Own price elasticity is highlighted in bold
Data from a recent meta-analysis [17] were used to estimate elasticities for SSBs (lemonade, fruit drinks), fruit juice and milk (average of whole and skim milk as
far as this was assessed). Since elasticity differs by socio-economic (income) status [13, 23], we constructed two elasticity strata (low/middle and high income). Bev-
erage consumption was transformed into energy consumption via energy density using a Standard Reference [22]
Table 3 Mean (SD) change of daily energy consumption (kJ/capita) at 20% SSB tax
Age group Male income groups Female income groups
(years) Low Middle High Low Middle High
15–19 −166 (125) −65 (93) −34 (66) −172 (120) −68 (87) −45 (59)
20–29 −376 (179) −210 (140) −159 (99) −128 (81) −22 (63) −15 (41)
30–39 −251 (126) −134 (99) −119 (80) −55 (59) −5 (47) 14 (36)
40–49 −129 (83) −69 (65) −54 (48) −52 (459 5 (38) 5 (25)
50–59 −61 (55) −9 (38) −15 (28) 8 (26) 23 (25) 21 (15)
60–69 5 (20) 20 (20) 11 (14) 18 (20) 39 (22) 33 (17)
70–79 4 (21) 21 (20) 11 (26) 19 (24) 38 (21) 31 (16)
Different gender, age and income groups were modelled. Note that in some groups, an SSB tax increased energy consumption, as SSB consumption was minimal
even without taxation, but cross-elasticity increased consumption of juice, resulting in higher energy consumption
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individuals. The benefit of a tax for reducing the preva-
lence of overweight and obesity was largest in those aged
20–29 years and male groups (Table 5). Obesity was also
reduced mainly in male populations. Translating these
relative changes in the prevalence rates to absolute num-
bers of avoided cases of overweight and obesity (Table 6)
shows that the largest benefit would, again, occur in
younger and mainly male groups.
Surprisingly, taxation had no benefit at the population
level in most female groups with middle or high income
and, generally, in groups aged 60 years or above. Within
the applied model, mean energy consumption even in-
creased in these groups (compare with Table 3). That was
as absolute consumption levels of SSBs, milk and juice
differed markedly in the older compared with younger
Table 4 Mean (SD) BMI of different gender, age and income groups with and without implementation of an SSB tax
Age group Male income groups Female income groups
(years) Low Middle High Low Middle High
15–19 No tax 24.0 (4.2) 21.7 (2.9) 21.9 (3.2) 24.8 (4.4) 23.7 (3.3) 20.4 (3.5)
Tax 23.3 (3.9) 21.5 (3.1) 21.7 (3.3) 24.0 (3.9) 23.4 (3.2) 20.2 (3.5)
20–29 No tax 25.2 (3.2) 24.8 (3.9) 23.6 (3.8) 21.4 (3.2) 22.5 (3.9) 21.4 (4.1)
Tax 23.9 (3.3) 24.1 (3.3) 23.1 (3.5) 21.3 (3.3) 22.5 (4.2) 21.4 (4.1)
30–39 No tax 27.8 (6.1) 25.4 (4.3) 25.8 (4.9) 26.2 (4.3) 23.5 (4.9) 21.8 (5.1)
Tax 26.9 (5.4) 24.9 (2.9) 25.4 (4.3) 26.0 (4.2) 23.5 (5.5) 21.8 (5.1)
40–49 No tax 28.3 (5.4) 26.9 (6.3) 27.2 (5.6) 25.7 (3.9) 24.7 (5.1) 22.6 (4.6)
Tax 27.8 (5.8) 26.8 (5.7) 27.0 (5.5) 25.6 (3.6) 24.7 (5.3) 22.6 (4.6)
50–59 No tax 29.1 (5.1 27.6 (5.2) 27.0 (5.3) 27.6 (6.2) 25.2 (6.1) 23.8 (5.1)
Tax 28.9 (5.9) 27.6 (6.1) 27.0 (4.9) 27.5 (6.4) 25.3 (6.2) 23.7 (4.9)
60–69 No tax 28.6 (6.1) 27.8 (5.8) 27.6 (6.1) 29.6 (6.8) 26.1 (5.9) 25.1 (4.7)
Tax 28.6 (5.7) 27.9 (5.7) 27.6 (5.7) 29.7 (6.6) 26.2 (5.7) 25.2 (5.0)
70–79 No tax 28.2 (5.5) 26.3 (6.0) 25.9 (4.3) 30.0 (7.1) 26.0 (5.0) 25.2 (5.4)
Tax 28.2 (6.0) 26.3 (6.1) 26.0 (4.2) 30.1 (7.0) 26.1 (5.5) 25.3 (5.5)
Note that in few groups, assumed cross-elasticity led to increased consumption of juice, while SSB consumption was low anyway; this led to higher BMI if a tax
was implemented
Table 5 The relative difference in prevalence rates (in %) of
overweight and obesity when levying a 20% SSB tax compared
with no tax, in different gender, age and income groups
Age group Male income groups Female income groups
(years) Low Middle High Low Middle High
15–19 Overweight −13 −9 −8 −12 −9 −7
Obese −16 −12 0 −16 −11 0
20–29 Overweight −28 −20 −20 −20 −7 −5
Obese −44 −28 −4 −12 −4 −3
30–39 Overweight −16 −15 −4 −8 0 +2
Obese −16 −14 −8 −8 +2 +3
40–49 Overweight −4 −4 0 −8 0 +2
Obese −4 −2 0 −4 +2 +3
50–59 Overweight 0 0 0 0 +1 +2
Obese 0 0 0 0 +2 +3
60–69 Overweight 0 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Obese 0 +1 0 +2 +2 +2
70–79 Overweight 0 +1 0 0 +2 +5
Obese 0 +1 0 +2 +4 +7
Table 6 Avoided number of overweight or obese individuals (in








(years) Low Middle High Low Middle High
15–19 Overweight 16 13 7 28 10 10 84
Obese 10 4 0 17 4 0 35
20–29 Overweight 140 132 136 80 14 13 515
Obese 108 80 16 28 6 6 244
30–39 Overweight 108 120 15 44 0 0 287
Obese 56 60 11 20 0 0 147
40–49 Overweight 36 44 0 60 0 0 140
Obese 16 16 0 20 0 0 52
50–59 Overweight 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Obese 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
60–69 Overweight 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
70–79 Overweight 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals Overweight 302 309 158 212 24 23
Obese 191 160 27 85 10 6
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groups (absolute SSB consumption was very low among
the elderly to begin with). Based on age-invariant cross-
price elasticities that also did not allow the size of the elas-
ticities to be contingent on initial consumption levels, the
same exogenous price change due to a given SSB tax level
led to a greater absolute increase in juice consumption
among the elderly than their SSB consumption was de-
creased. Moreover, as both milk and juice were assumed
to have higher energy densities than SSBs, this shift in ab-
solute consumption was additionally aggravated when
transformed into energy consumption. Last, older age
groups generally consumed lower amounts of energy con-
taining beverages (and instead more water), which reduces
any impact of an SSB tax in this group.
As one reason for the net-increase in the elderly’s en-
ergy consumption from taxation in Table 3 is the im-
plausible invariance of cross-price elasticities with
respect to age and initial SSB consumption levels, we
additionally applied age-adjusted cross-price elasticities,
based on the observation that the elderly have lower
SSB consumption before tax and cross-price elasticities
would be zero for any person with zero pre-tax SSB
consumption, to evaluate the relative changes in the
prevalence rates of overweight and obesity (Additional
file 1: Table S1). It was notable that except for the age
group 15–18 years, the reductions in prevalence were
more homogenously distributed across age and income
groups, with all groups benefiting from taxation, albeit
in some groups at a lower level.
Compared with the base-case, assuming a lower pass-
on rate reduced the absolute benefit of taxation (Table 7),
as did decreasing the tax rate to 10% or 5%. Applying
age-adjusted cross-price elasticities had only limited im-
pact on the overall absolute numbers of avoided over-
weight or obesity (Table 7).
Discussion
Based on this study, an SSB tax could decrease calorie
consumption and average population BMI in Germany.
Such findings are in line with observational studies
confirming an effect of a tax on SSB purchases [12, 34].
An SSB tax would be especially beneficial for younger
individuals, males, and those with low income (i.e. the
main SSB consumers), and could thus be valuable with
regard to health equity, too [35]. Future studies should
focus on this age group to assess benefits but also poten-
tial risks of an SSB tax. Overall and in absolute terms, one
could expect a significant number of avoided overweight
or obese individuals. The magnitude of the reduction both
in relative and absolute terms is also similar to that re-
ported for other countries, assuring us as to the validity of
the used model [15–17]. However, when comparing esti-
mated prevalence rates in different groups, we found
certain under- and over-estimations in subgroups of
income strata (especially for the prevalence for obesity),
while the overall estimate (regardless of income groups)
was near congruent with those found in epidemiologic
surveys [30, 36].
Based on our findings, it is likely that the group to
benefit the most are those aged 20–29 or, more gener-
ally, younger individuals, with higher benefits in male
than female. This was mainly due to SSB consumption
being high in these groups, while juice and milk con-
sumption were low. It should be highlighted that, as
discussed, it is uncertain if there would truly be an
overall increase in energy consumption in elder and
female groups, as our results in Table 3 suggest. Among
the elderly, relatively stable behavioral patterns might
have formed, which would mean that their own- and
cross-price elasticities are lower than estimated for all
age groups combined. Moreover, cross-price elasticities
are likely to be lower at low initial levels of SSB con-
sumption, as observed among the elderly. Applying dif-
ferent cross-price elasticities in low SSB consuming
groups adjusted for the possible distortion and found
the benefits of the tax to be more homogeneously dis-
tributed. However, as these age-specific estimates of
elasticities were constructed on the basis of plausible
behavioral assumptions instead of empirical evidence
(to assess the robustness of our findings rather than to
estimate precise effects), caution is needed when inter-
preting the findings of this sensitivity analysis.
This study has a number of strengths and limitations.
First, nationally representative consumption data was
used, which increases confidence in the policy implica-
tions. However, NSV II used dietary recording via diar-
ies for estimating beverage consumption, which is
prone for bias by misreporting. Further studies should
strive and validate these consumption estimates using
sales data. Data from NSV II could also be regarded as
potentially outdated, as they were more than 7 years old;
given the historic secular trend of an increasing consump-
tion [7, 37] we could have under-estimated the effects of a
tax on energy consumption and weight. Similarly, weight
and height estimates were self-reported, with possible bias
Table 7 Scenario analyses







Pass-on 80% 718 280
Tax 10% 465 164
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leading to underestimation of the BMI and possible
underestimation of the benefits of a tax.
Second, elasticities were derived from a number of
sources, as reported in a recent meta-analysis, and might
not fully apply to Germany, leading to some distortions.
Moreover, the used elasticity estimates are not age-
specific and may thus lead to an over-estimation of the
increase in juice consumption that an SSB tax triggers
among the elderly, an issue which requires further study
on the basis of age-specific elasticities. Ideally, one
should also allow elasticity estimates to vary with initial
SSB consumption levels (as attempted in our sensitivity
analysis).
Third, the very concept of price elasticity of demand is
an inevitable simplification based on the assumption that
observed market demand is informative of individual be-
havioural responses to exogenous price changes, raising
the issue of aggregation. Yet in research on tax policy,
price elasticity is a well-established analytical tool to
characterize (in one precise and easily compared sum-
mary measure) the shape of demand curves, i.e. plots of
the geometric location of observed demand in a diagram
with given prices of a good on the vertical axis and the
quantities demanded at these prices on the horizontal
axis, and to predict the empirical incidence of new taxes
or tax changes. While in economic theory it is possible
to specify downward-sloping demand curves by means
of mathematical functions with constant price elasticity
along the entire curve, the exact shape of real-world
demand curves is usually unknown and could only be
estimated with a very large number of individual obser-
vations. Their price elasticity is likely to vary with the
initial level of demand before an exogenous price
change, such as a tax, is introduced so that any elasticity
estimate can only be an approximation for the relevant
initial price level. An additional caveat is that price elas-
ticities tend to ignore income effects of price changes,
i.e. the reduction in available income for other goods
after a purchase is made, but these effects are likely to
be negligible in the present context as spending on SSBs
is likely to be only a small proportion of consumers’
total spending on consumption goods.
Fourth, substitution of SSBs with sugary foods has also
not been modelled but might have some impact on energy
consumption; there might even be a complementary rela-
tionship, implying an even larger benefit from taxing SSBs
[38]. Fifth, the association between energy consumption
and weight was assumed to be linear, leading to a new
steady state after weight reduction occurred. This assump-
tion is certainly a simplification, as different equations for
men and women are likely to apply [15, 16, 39]. Metabolic
rates might change after weight loss (for example due to
different mobility of lighter than heavier individuals).
Moreover, changes in energy intake due to elasticity might
take place over a long-term period, which we did not ac-
count for. Similarly, we did not draw parameters from a
correlation matrix, while weight, height and SSB con-
sumption are likely to be correlated. Last, our study only
describes the effects of a tax on obesity, while a range of
other diseases may be triggered or aggravated. That, in
turn, would also affect the cost-effectiveness. In general, it
would be relevant to assess not only the effects of sugar
consumption via increased energy intake, but also other
proposed harmful effects of sugary diets [40].
Conclusions
Within these limitations and the specific assumptions
made in this study, implementing a 20% tax on SSBs is
likely to reduce overweight and obesity mainly in youn-
ger age groups, males and those with lower income. This
finding, however, is highly dependent on estimates of the
underlying own-price and cross-price elasticities, which
might be improved through future research. In general,
we expect significant relative and absolute benefits,
which could translate into relevant effects on morbidity
and mortality.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Table S1. Sensitivity analysis. The relative difference in
prevalence of overweight and obesity rates when levying a 20% SSB-tax
compared with no tax, when applying age-adjusted cross-price elasticities
(in %). Compare with Table 5, where cross-price elasticities were not age-
adjusted. (DOC 39 kb)
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